



SUBJECT: Sales of Custom-Produced Aerial IEDs (AIEDs) to Al Qaeda and Possibly Islamic State in Lebanon

DATE: October 17, 2016

LOCATION(S): Beirut, Lebanon; Aleppo Province, Syria; Kurdistan Region, Iraq

OBSERVATIONS

BEIRUT CITY: *FlyCam [UAV] Equipped with Explosives Confiscated*

October 15, 2016

EMERGENT TTP

“...The General Security [forces] arrested in the **area of Bhamdoun** a **group of eight** people inside [an **al Nusra Front arms trader’s**] **warehouse**...the patrol found explosives and a **FlyCam UAV capable of carrying a small bomb**... [the warehouse owner] was **selling explosives to several terrorist organizations**, including the [Islamic State] ... ‘**If only you came yesterday, you would have found six FlyCams equipped with explosive materials,**’ five of which were sold to **al Nusra**, he said” – see **article** for more details. (Source: [Naharnet-Lebanon/As Safir](#))

Information Link: [FlyCamUAV.Com](#)



Photo Source: [FlyCamUAV.Com](#)

BACKGROUND

Two **Islamic State (IS) explosive-laden UAV/drone attacks** occurred in Syria and Iraq on September 28th and October 2nd, respectively. In the September attack, three Turkish soldiers were wounded by a mini-drone in Aleppo Province, Syria. In the early October attack, two Peshmerga fighters were killed and two French paratroops were wounded (one critically) after picking up an explosive-drone that was either brought down by security forces or deliberately crashed in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.

A report from [Naharnet.Com](#) also indicates an aerial IED was confiscated during a security raid at a warehouse in Beirut Governorate, Lebanon on October 15th. Ominously, a captured arms trader is alleged to have said he’d sold five more units to **al Nusra** the day before.

TAKEAWAYS

- Dialogue suggests some manufacturing capability has been put into motion—a hallmark of IS explosive-related operations.
- Production capability for al Nusra elements and IS has been developed or is underway—perhaps using preferred components such as the FlyCam UAV.
- AIED attack activity is likely to increase in the next few weeks with major engagements underway in Mosul and throughout Syria.



- Field reporting and defensive actions should not be limited to one type of suspected AIED vehicle – SMIED attacks using a variety of commercially available fixed wing or rotary blade UAVs is plausible.
- Islamist terrorist-insurgent AIED applications against soft-targets are likely under development, viable and congruent with past actions.
- Immediate development of military countermeasures should be in progress i.e. intelligence fusion, pre-attack indicators, reporting protocols, physical warning systems, immediate action drills upon suspicion/discovery, enemy UAV/drone handling protocols, rescue protocols, explosive disposal, lessons learned, checklists and training, etc.
- Multiple or follow-on AIED-strikes are a logical follow-up to previous single-vehicle attacks.
- Terrorist-insurgent innovation is at an all-time high. Do not allow heel-diggers to underestimate your adversary's capability for creative attack. Table Tops, Tiger Teams, Black Hat efforts & Red Teaming are recommended actions.

There is a need to know.

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